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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3739 
 ___________ 
 
GEORGE M. ROWANN, Appellant 
 
   v. 
 
BRIAN V. COLEMAN, (Warden), et al.; JOHN DOE(S), 
Employees, et al. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-01222) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 14, 2012 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: August 15, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
George Rowann, a pro se litigant in the custody of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, appeals the dismissal of his civil-rights suit.  We will affirm. 
Because the parties are our primary audience, we need not recite the facts of this 
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case at length.  In his original complaint, Rowann challenged his placement in 
disciplinary custody at both SCI-Smithfield and SCI-Fayette, naming superintendant 
Brian V. Coleman and “each of his officers, agents, employees, and all persons acting in 
concert or participation with them” as defendants.  Later, Rowann filed a document 
entitled “The Complaint,” which appeared to allege that, in retaliation for filing the 
lawsuit, he had been assaulted on two occasions by guards at the facility.  The District 
Court sua sponte dismissed the suit without prejudice, concluding that 1) it would have 
been impossible for Rowann to have exhausted his administrative remedies under the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) before pursuing legal action, as he complained of 
incidents taking place on September 7 but filed suit a week later; and 2) the document 
entitled “The Complaint,” which was construed as a supplemental complaint,1 was 
impermissibly filed without leave of the court, but was in any event moot because the 
original complaint was to be dismissed.  Rowann appealed.2
Our first task is to determine what issues are properly before us.  It is well settled 
that an appellant’s failure raise a particular issue in his opening brief results in waiver of 
that issue.  
 
See Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Att’y Gen.
                                                 
1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 
1188 (3d Cir. 1979). 
, 677 F.3d 519, 545 (3d Cir. 
2012).  We have not yet decided, in a precedential opinion, whether this rule applies with 
 
2 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 
188, 192 (3d Cir. 2007), we conduct plenary review of the dismissal of the complaint.  
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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full force to pro se litigants, who are otherwise afforded courtesies not extended to their 
represented counterparts, such as liberal construction of pleadings.  See, e.g., Henderson 
v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1117 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).  Other courts have held that it 
does so apply.  See, e.g., Timson v. Sampson
 In his opening, informal brief, Rowann insists that he was the victim of retaliation 
and that he was unable to file grievances because of interference by prison officials.  He 
fails, however, to address the salient question in this case, to which his attention was 
specifically drawn in the briefing order: did the District Court erroneously dismiss his 
supplemental complaint as moot?  Arguing the facts of the supplemental complaint is 
unavailing, because those factual contentions were never properly before the District 
Court and were not the basis of its ruling.  We conclude that when a pro se appellant 
declines to brief a matter that he was explicitly instructed to raise, he has waived the issue 
in question unless extraordinary circumstances affected his compliance.  No such 
circumstances are apparent here. 
, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam). 
Rowann’s alternative grievance argument is also unsuccessful.  Rowann submitted 
evidence in District Court to support his contention that efforts to exhaust his 
administrative remedies were frustrated.  See, e.g., ECF No. 38-2.  Problematically, his 
submissions dated from after the initiation of the suit; in other words, they bolstered, 
rather than undermined, the District Court’s conclusion that he had impermissibly 
pursued federal litigation before even attempting to exhaust his administrative remedies, 
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a course prohibited by the PLRA.  See Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 
2003); Neal v. Goord
Having determined that the procedural question is waived, and finding no merit in 
Rowann’s attempt to excuse compliance with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
, 267 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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3 To the extent that Rowann argues that the District Court failed to properly consider a 
request for injunctive relief, any such error was harmless, as Rowann failed to show that 
he was likely to succeed on the merits of his complaint.  See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  Similarly, although a District Court should 
generally not raise sua sponte the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust, see Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), it may do so if the defense is apparent from the face of 
the complaint.  See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 296 (3d Cir. 2002).  In this case, a filing 
date mere days after the complained-of incident satisfies the Kertes standard; and, in any 
event, Rowann was given an opportunity to explain himself after being put on notice of 
the defect in his complaint, but failed to do so.  
  Our decision today is without prejudice to 
Rowann’s filing a new suit based on the facts he would have alleged in his supplemental 
complaint, assuming he first exhausts his administrative remedies and complies with all 
other procedural requirements; we stress that we have not evaluated the merits of the 
allegations contained therein.    
